Hume on volition and the faculty of the will

Abstract

My purpose here is to argue that different senses can be attributed to the terms “will” and “volition” in Hume's philosophy. Unlike traditional interpretations, I argue that Hume does not identify will and volition. Firstly, I present arguments of Hobbes and Locke against traditional scholastic conception of the production of voluntary actions and that Hume is associated with these two philosophers. Secondly, I present the arguments of the traditional interpretation that identifies will and volition in Hume’s philosophy and also made some objections to such arguments. Finally, I argue as opposed to the traditional interpretation that Hume believes that the will can be understood as the faculty by which we produce voluntary actions and that volitions are motivational passions in exercise. The motivational passions that produce actions are volition, the perception by which we produce voluntary actions.