Hume’s final cut against the argument of design

Abstract

Based on Hume’s criticism to the design’s argument in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, my aim in this article is to make an analysis of the relation between the existence of evil in the world and the supposed existence of a deity possessing the traditional attributes of theism. From this analysis, I intend to defend the thesis according to which the treatment Hume gives to the problem of evil is the final cut – the last and decisive resource that Philo (the character who articulates this criticism) drives to show that the design hypothesis does not provide a solid and consistent basis to support to the belief in the existence of a God sovereignty powerful, just and benevolent and that, therefore, the evil's existence in the world offers a more cogent argumentation against the design argument. So, I also defend that the improbability of God's existence, especially from parts 10-11, is greater than on basis on arguments presented in parts 2-8 of the Dialogues. It means that I take the evil’s problem here as the biggest problem for the experimental theist - whose argumentation seeks to prove the existence of God from the observation of the phenomena of the world.