Moral pluralism and Practical reasoning
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17648/2175-2834-v21n2-388Keywords:
pluralism; rationality; morality.Abstract
My aim is to clarify and specify what is moral pluralism. My starting point is what I consider the deepest and most radical type of moral conflict: the conflict between incommensurable values. Next, I deal with moral sensibility and the limits of its role in scenarios of practical conflict. Last, I introduce a model of practical rationality consistent with the most radical form of moral pluralism. My conclusion is that, rather than signifying the abdication of rationality in the practical domain, pluralism, once integrated in our moral and political culture, brings relevant lessons of tolerance to our age.References
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Acessado em: 24 de setembro de 2019.
