Cognitive Processes and Extended-Mind: a neofunctionalist metafhor?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17648/2175-2834-v22n1-425Keywords:
extended mind; cognition; functionalism; artificial intelligence.Abstract
This article intends to analyze how the extended mind hypothesis, on one hand, redraws the concept of cognitive processes based on a critique of physical/mental parallelism and, on the other hand, is grounded on functionalist arguments to consider other levels of the organism and the environment. With this purpose, initially, we indicate how the physical/mental dichotomy builds an epistemologically confused image, especially when considering the mental causation argument. The thesis that mental processes interfere with physical phenomena, or vice versa, is a legacy of the Cartesian tradition. Later, we argue that the concept of an extended mind does not adequately explain the use of artifacts, inferring an evolutionary prognosis in the human species. Finally, we identified some dilemmas – epistemological and moral – between the cognitive processes and proposals of Artificial Intelligence.References
Aranyosi, István. “A New Argument for Mind-Brain Identity”. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 62, 3, Sep. 2011, pp.489-517.
Awad, Edmond et al. “The Moral Machine Experiment”. In: Nature, vol. 563, 2018, pp.59-64.
Barack, David L. “Mental Machines”. In: Biology & Philosophy, 34, 63(2019),
Bloor, David. “Is the Official Theory of Mind Absurd?”. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 21, 2, may. 1970, pp.167-183.
Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur. “Ethics Commission. Automated and Connected Driving”. Disponível em:
<https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/EN/publications/report-ethics-commission-automated-and-connected-driving.pdf?__blob=publicationFile>. Acesso em 18/02/2020, às 10:20h.
Churchland, Patricia. Touching a Nerve: The Self as Brain. London: W. Norton & Company, 2013.
Clark, Andy. Microcognition: philosophy, cognitive science and parallel distributed processing; Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989.
___________. Being there: putting brain, body and world together again. 2a ed;
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997.
___________. Mindware: and introduction to the philosophy of cognitive science; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
___________. Natural-born cyborgs: Minds, technologies, and the future of human intelligence; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
___________. “Language, embodiment and the cognitive niche”. In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 10, nº 8, 2006, pp. 370-374.
___________. Supersizing the Mind: embodiment, action and cognitive extension. Oxford: OUP, 2008.
Clark, Andy; Chalmers, David. “The Extended Mind”. In: Analysis, vol. 58, nº 1, 1998, pp.7-19.
Colombetti, Giovanna; Thompson, Evan. The feeling body: toward an enactive approach to emotion. In: Overton, Willis F.; Müller, Ulrich; Newman, Judith L. (Eds.). Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness; New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2007. p. 45-68.
Colombetti, Giovanna. The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind; Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2013.
Greif, Hajo. What is the extension of the extended mind? In: Synthese, vol. 194, 2010, pp.4311-4336.
Heersmink, Richard. “Extended mind and cognitive enhancement: moral
aspects of cognitive artifacts”. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 16, 2015, pp.17-32.
Hochstein, Eric. “When does ‘Folk Psychology’ count as Folk Psychological?”. In: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 68(4), 2017, pp.1125-1147.
Hofweber, Thomas. “Idealism and the Harmony of Thought and Reality”. In: Mind, vol. 128, nº511, jul. 2019, pp.699-734.
Krellenstein, Marc. “ Unsolvable problems, visual imagery and explanatory satisfaction”. In: Journal of Mind and Behavior, 16, 1995, pp. 235–253.
Nagel, Thomas. “What is it like to be a bat?”. In: Philosophical Review, 83, 1974, pp.435-456.
Menary, Richard. Cognitive integration: mind and cognition unbounded; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Nayar, Pramod K. Posthumanism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.
Peruzzo Júnior, Léo. Intentionality, Conceptual Content, and Emotions. In: Aurora, vol. 31, nº 54, 2019, pp.833-847.
Pirenne, M. H. “Descartes and the Body-Problem in Physiology”. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. I, 1, may. 1950, 43-59.
Roden, David. Posthuman Life: philosophy at the edge of the human; New York: Routledge, 2015.
Ryle, Gilbert. The Concepto f Mind. London; New York: Routledge, 2009.
Santana, Carlos. “Waiting for the Anthropocene”. In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 70, 2019, pp.1073-1096.
Searle, John. “Minds, Brains and Programs”. In: Hofstadter, D.; Dennett, D. (Orgs.). The Mind´s. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
Stone, Tony; Davies, Martin. “Cognitive Neuropsychology and the Philosophy of Mind”. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol.44, 1993, pp.589-622.
Teixeira, João da Fernandes. O que é Inteligência Artificial?. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 2008.
Vlerick, Michael. “A cognitive perspective on scientific realism”. In: Philosophical Psychology, vol. 32(8), 2019, pp.1157-1178.
Watson, George. “Apparent Motion and the Mind-Body Problem”. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. II, 7, nov. 1951, pp.236-247.
Wheeler, Michael. In defense of extended functionalism. In: Menary, Richard. The Extended Mind; Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010. p.245-270.
Wilks, Yorick. “Putnam and Clarke and Mind and Body”. In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 26(3), 1975, pp.213-225.
