Processos Cognitivos e Mente Estendida: uma metáfora neofuncionalista?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17648/2175-2834-v22n1-425Resumo
Este artigo pretende analisar como a hipótese da mente estendida, por um lado, redesenha o conceito de processos cognitivos a partir de uma crítica ao paralelismo físico/mental e, por outro, se ampara em argumentos funcionalistas para considerar outros níveis do organismo e do ambiente. Para tanto, inicialmente, mostramos como a dicotomia físico/mental constrói uma imagem epistemologicamente confusa, especialmente quando se considera o argumento da causação mental. A tese de que os processos mentais interfiram nos fenômenos físicos, ou vice-versa, é um legado da tradição cartesiana. Posteriormente, argumentamos que o conceito de mente estendida não explica adequadamente o uso dos artefatos, inferindo um prognóstico evolutivo na espécie humana. Por fim, identificamos alguns dilemas – epistemológicos e morais – entre os processos cognitivos e propostas da Inteligências Artificial.Referências
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