The ontology of psychoanalysis

Abstract

There are two assumptions underlying this article related to theories' ontological commitment. According to the first assumption, ontological commitment is epistemologically dependent on theories, since theories establish conditions of objectivity which ultimately constitute the objects they deal with. The second one assumes that theorization about those conditions is done within an epistemic frame which distributes and evaluates them. In accordance with Dilthey, this ontological demarcations might be dependent on types of procedures. Hence, there would be two realities: physical reality, related to scientific and experimental procedures, and historical reality, related to hermeneutic procedures. Physical reality can be explained, but historical reality can only be comprehended. We analyze three interpretations of the Freudian psychoanalysis by Ricoeur, Grünbaum y Hopkins, in order to show the limits of the commitment to a sole set of procedures. This proposal aims to show that the explanation-comprehension dichotomy is a false one, and that neither explanation nor comprehension suffice to constitute ontologies of their own. A science in which procedures are not of only one type would set a limit to that opposition. This would force a revision of the metatheory behind ír. We expect to show that psychoanalysis might be such a science. Key-words: explanation; comprehension; ontological relativity; psychoanalysis; epistemology.