O problema mente-corpo e o problema mentemente da metapsicologia: pontos de convergência entre a psicanálise freudiana e as ciências cognitivas

Abstract

From the Freudian bet on the possibility of constructing a naturalistic model of mind - which, among other things, could make the relation between the somatic and the psychic intelligible - results his theory of the psychic apparatus and all the metapsychological reflection organized around it. Such a theory, however, seems to bring about to metapsychology the apparently insurmountable embarrassment in satisfactorily dealing with the consciousness in the psychological naturalistic terms intended by Freud. From this standpoint, Freudian theory resembles the same situation thar can be diagnosed nowadays in the area of cognitive sciences, which, in general, comprise the retrieval of a naturalistic project for psychology where the construction of mental cognitive models purports to have accomplished non-controversial solutions for the mind-body problem in excluding from their approach the conscious experience and the mental subjective dimension, bringing about what can be called, according to Ray Jackendoff, the "mind-mind problem". The objective of this work is to discuss such convergence, the reaching and limitations of a naturalistic approach in psychology, and the relative relevance of Freudian epistemology to the present time when considered in this context. Key-words: Freud; mind; consciousness; mind-body problem; cognitive science.