"Comprehension of being" as a barrier to the other? Lévinas, being and time and the second Heidegger

Abstract

The most important aspect of the reception of Martin Heidegger's (1889-1976) project of a "fundamental ontology", which can be found in Being and Time (1927), by Emmanuel Lévinas (1905-1995) lays in the critique of the concept of "comprehension of being". This expression is for Lévinas nothing else but a cornerstone of a philosophy which cannot deal adequately with the question of the other. The aim of this article is to estimate properly the relevance as well as the limits this critique by the means of the interpretation of some passages of Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy (1936-38) which handle with the concept of "comprehension of being" By showing this we hope to identify elements which could consolidate a philosophical debate - which historically never took place - between Lévinas and the later Heidegger. Keywords: Emmanuel Lévinas, Martin Heidegger, Ontology, Ethics, Comprehension of being.