A abordagem fenomenológico-existencial da enfermidade: uma revisão
Resumen
No presente artigo apresento uma revisão da abordagem fenomenológica e existencialda enfermidade. As três primeiras seções examinam as noções fundamentais da fenomenologiamédica, apresentando as linhas gerais do paradigma do corpo vivido, no intuito de caracterizar aabordagem fenomenológica da enfermidade. Nas duas seções seguintes, são examinadas asinterpretações do corpo enfermo que se baseiam na analogia com o utensílio quebrado,destacando o conceito de enfermidade como sintonia do desterro (Unheimlichkeit) corporal daexistência. Na última seção são apresentadas as principais criticas à abordagem fenomenológicada medicina e da enfermidade.Citas
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